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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between arousal and depression has received
more attention and elaboration in theoretical works than in research
studies.

Aaron Beck (1967) theorized that one's cognitive schema

result in one constructing the experience, the self, and the future as
negative and thereby causing the affective state of depression.

Albert

Ellis (1975) postulated similar cognitive functions in feelings of
anxiety and depression.

Stanley Schachter and others have demonstrated

the labeling of arousal that goes on in euphoria and anger in their
research, but their work did not extend to sadness and depression.
Extending the theoretical implications of Schachter's work to depression, his idea that labeling a situation as depressing triggers arousal,
corresponds to Beck's idea that the negative structuring of experience
triggers depressive emotions.

Schachter proposes the converse to be

true also: the label of depression may be applied to arousal states on
the basis of situational cues.

Schachter's theory applied to depres-

sion may provide a somewhat broader explanation of the origins and
chronicity of depression than Beck's theory and a rationale for many of
the s.ymptoms Beck describes but does not explain.

1

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPRESSION
Beck (1967, 1974) classified depressive s.rmptoms in four
categories:

emotional, cognitive, motivational, and physical or

vegetative.
Emotional signs are painful dejection, loss of interest, loss
of feelings of affection, self-dislike, crying spells, lack of enjoyment, and loss of sense of humor (Beck, 1974; Freud, 1917; Ullmann and
Krasner, 1969; Weiss, 1944).

Most severely depressed ps,ychiatric

patients report some degree of sadness or dejection, generally using
such terms as "miserable," "blue," or "down-hearted." The dysphoric
emotions can result from feelings of self-dislike, uselessness, or
disappointment in the self.

Depressed individuals fail to enjoy

activities that they enjoyed previously, whether social, productive, or
biological, and curtail their activities.

Feelings of affection or

enjoyment may be replaced by resentment, apathy, or boredom.

Depressed

individuals may not feel like laughing even though they perceive the
punchline in jokes.
Cognitive signs are loss of self-esteem, negative expectations,
exaggerated view of problems, and attribution of blame to the self
(Beck, 1974; Freud, 1917; Reese, 1971; Ullmann and Krasner, 1969).
Cognitive signs represent distorted views of the self and world, so
that the depressed individual feels inadequate and worthless and sees
no possibility of future improvement.
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He may be unable to make
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decisions because he anticipates making the wrong choice.

He tends in

general to blame adverse experiences on his own defeciencies.
Motivational signs are increased dependency, loss of motivation,
avoidance, indecisiveness, and suicidal wishes (Beck, 1974; Ullmann and
Krasner, 1969).

A depressed person wishes to escape demands on his·

energy, perhaps to the point of suicide.

Increased dependency is mani-

fested by a desire for help.
Physical and vegetative signs are loss of appetite, sleep
disturbance, fatigability, loss of sexual interest, and inhibition of
activity (Beck, 1974; Ullmann and Krasner, 1969; Weiss, 1944).

Sad

facial expressions, slow movement, less speech or, conversely, incessant activity and restlessness may characterize the depressed individual.
He may lose interest in food or sex or be unable to sleep and tire
easily.
The pattern of s.ymptoms varies from person to person, and
people who are not clinically depressed but merely experiencing mood
swings may exhibit some of them.

Those signs most often mentioned in

the literature seem to be the emotional signs which describe affect.

MODELS OF DEPRESSION
Ps.ychodynarnic Model
Psychodynamic theories attribute depression to the loss of a
loved object or the loss of self-esteem (Wilkins, 1971).

Freud

(1917)

saw it as an imaginary, feared, or vaguely perceived loss that deprived
the ego.

The loss in depression was that part of the loved object

which was incorporated into the ego.

Freud compared depression to grief

because he thought that both involve loss of a loved object but differentiated them in that the loss was obvious and external in grief but in
depression was an ego function and, therefore, unobservable.

A more

concrete description of the process of feared loss of the loved object
comes from Hill

(1947). He traced the onset of depression as follows:

the individual with a depression-prone personality unconsciously charms
another until it seems that a healthy, affectionate, reciprocal relationship has developed.

The depression-prone personality then escalates

his demands insatiably and expresses increasing disapproval as they are
frustrated.

The resultant rage is inhibited to prevent losing the loved

object completely or provoking the superego.

The inhibited rage arouses

the anxiety (fear) of losing the loved object and guilt (punishment by
the superego for becoming enraged).
Others considered the loss more real than imagined.

Rado

(1928)

believed that the loss of a loved object resulted in a loss of selfesteem in persons with a precarious self-concept and narcissistic need
for approval.

Depression and self-vilification were punishment of the
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ego by the superego and attempts at expiation undertaken in order to win
back love.

Bibring (1953) also theorized that the loss of self-esteem

causing depression could result from frustrated-needs for love and
affection but added that it could result from frustration of other needs
as well.

He saw depression as the expression of the awareness of the

ego of its helplessness or powerlessness.

Jacobson (1953, 1954) and

Klein (1948) also theorized that loss of self-esteem and depression
resulted from frustration and lack of gratification.
Abraham (1911, 1916. 1924) saw depression as a real or feared
loss of an object of gratification but concentrated less on the loss
than the feelings of hostility toward the loved object which undermined
the depressive individual's capacity for affection.

The ambivalence of

feelings about the object choice was also directed toward the part of
the ego which represented the object; that is, the hostility directed
against the ego in the form of self-accusation was another

m~nifestation

of the hostility toward the loved object.
In general, frustration of a need, whether for love or achievement, results in an ego loss and depression follows as a reaction.

The

feelings of hostility toward a loved object that has been lost are
likely to alienate that object further and escalate the guilt that the
depressive individual feels due to his hostility.

PS,Ychoanalytic

interpretations of depression concentrate on internal factors and tend
to ignore environmental influence.
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Behavioral Model
Behaviorists attribute depression to a decrease in reinforcement
(Wilkins, 1971).

Ferster (1965) proposed that any change resulting in a

relative inability to acquire positive reinforcers could produce a
depression.

He asserted that the loss of a "significant other" causes a

sudden reduction in behavioral output and consequently a reduced rate of
positive reinforcement.

A depressive person seems to be especially

vulnerable to the loss of a loved person or object because of the
tendency Ferster observed to restrict the number of persons with whom
they interact.

Lazarus (1968) published case studies which supported

the association of a depressed state with a lack of positive reinforcement.

Removing reinforcers from an individual' s environment brought on

depression while increasing the individual's ability to acquire additional reinforcers alleviated depression.

He proposed that depressions

which could not be explained by learning theory are probably of organic
origin.
Either personal characteristics or environmental factors may
cause the low reinforcement rate (Lewinsohn, Shaffer, and Libet, 1969;
Patterson and Rosenberry, cited in Beck, 1974).

For example, depressive.

persons may lack social skills and, therefore, have fewer sources of
available .reinforcement, experience greater deprivation from loss of a
source, or find it more difficult to replace a lost reinforcer.

A

change in the individual's role status, as in aging, may result in
previously reinforced behavior no longer being reinforced and consequently in depression (Ullmann and Krasner, 1969).

Kanfer (1971)

proposed that self-reinforcement tends to match previous external
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reinforcement serving to maintain behavior.

Such a tendency would serve

to perpetuate depressive moods.
In general terms, presentation of a reinforcer increases the

strength of a response while the removal or loss of a reinforcer
decreases its strength.

Thus reduction in reinforcers could produce-

avoidance behavior and inactivity further reducing the possibility of
Lewinsohn, et al (1969) asserted that depressive

reinforcement.

behavior alienates other

people~

This would further reduce

~he

number

of positive reinforcers and contribute to the continuation of the
depressive cycle.
behaviors and

~void

Since behaviorists prefer to deal with external
discussing internal and unobservable affective

states, they neglect subjective components of depression such as
feelings of sadness or hopelessness and suicidal wishes.

Behavior

theory has been applied only to limited aspects of depression.
Cognitive Model
Beck (1967, 1974) posits a set of three major cognitive patterns
which cause the disturbances in depression.
The first component is the construction of experience in a
negative way such that life seems to be filled with defeat, deprivation,
and disparagement.

This is a selective interpretation which transforms

neutral or ambiguous situations into self-deflating ones through
inaccuracies and misinterpretations which focus on the most negative
aspects of the situation.

The depressed person is likely to set high

standards for himself and any falling short of these standards is
perceived as total failure.

He is likely to feel substantially

deprived by relatively trivial. events whether in terms of money, time,
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or self-esteem, and to feel the loss most keenly in comparing himself
with other people who seem more fortunate.

He is also likely to inter-

pret neutral or even favorable remarks by others as disparaging or to
feel that other people have derogatory ideas about him.
The second component of depression is a negative view of the
self as deficient, inadequate, and unworthy.

Unpleasant experiences

are attributed to defects in the self which leads to feelings of
worthlessness and self-rejection.

The depressed person tends to over-

generalize from a particular behavior to a character trait, to interpret
a minor variation in performance as a major shortcoming on which he
bases his entire self-concept.

He defines himself in terms of this

deficiency and then rejects himself for it.
The third component is a negative view of the future such that
current difficulties seem to continue indefinitely.

The depressed

person tends to be preoccupied with thoughts of the future, generally
as an extension of his view of the present.

Both long and short-range

forecasts are of a similar negative nature--anticipation of failure
accompanied by feelings of the impossibility of feeling better and the
futility of trying.
The affective state is regarded as the consequence of the way
the individual views himself or his environment.

The depressed person

perceives his behavior as involving failure or loss and consequently
feels sad or apathetic.

His reaction may be based on faulty interpreta-

tion of available data such that new information is distorted to fit the
negative conceptualization
new information.

~ather

than modifying the concept to fit the

Thus the affect remains negative.
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Motivation is likewise seen as the consequence of cognition.
Motivation to perform some action depends on cognitions about the
likelihood of success and possible benefits.

Motivational changes in

depression such as paralysis of will, escapist and avoidance wishes,
suicidal wishes, and intensified dependency wishes are responses to
changes in cognitions about the self and the world as negative.
Briefly, the cognitive model states that the person first thinks
he is bad and worthless and then feels depressed.

The content of the

person's cognitions is derived from the individual's past experiences,
a generalization relating to the individual's goals, values, and
attitudes.

SCHACHTER' S THEORY OF EMOTION

Stanley Schachter has developed a theory of emotion stressing
the interaction of two components--physiological arousal and cognitions
about the situation.

In initial research he assumed that emotion is an

interaction of arousal of the s.rmpathetic nervous s.ystem and the
cognitions explaining the arousal.

Schachter and Singer ( 1962) found

that euphoric or angry behavior and emotions were adopted by a subject
from a stooge showing such behaviors provided that the subject was
injected with epinephrine rather than a placebo and provided that he was
not informed about the possible physiological effects of the drug.
Subjects who were ignorant of the drug's effects were more likely to
attribute their arousal to the situation and participate in the stooge's
unusual actions.

A problem with the method was that placebos do not

block ordinary arousal, so that a subject could become angry or euphoric
from the situation alone.

Use of epinephrine, chlorpromazine (a tran-

quilizer), and a placebo in an amusing situation overcame this difficulty (Schachter and Wheeler, 1962).

The tranquilizer served to prevent

normal arousal and the epinephrine to produce more than normal arousal.
Once again the subject's behavioral response and ratings of the funniness of the movie depended on both the drug he received and the type of
information he had as to its possible effects.

Those who failed to

associate arousal symptoms with the drug acted and described themselves
as more emotional in the staged situations.

Nisbett and Schachter

(1966) used shock instead of drugs to produce arousal and used a placebo
10
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described as arousal-producing as the contrived situation.
case, subjects who associated arousal

~mptoms

In this

with the drug rather than

the shock tolerated higher levels of shock than those who associated
arousal

~mptoms

with the shock itself.

In all these cases, arousal was

attributed to whatever element of the total situation seemed most
salient:

a drug, a movie, or another person's behavior.
According to Kelley's theory of attribution {1967), attribution

is the process of attaining cognitive mastery of the causal structure of
the environment, or, more simply, the process of deciding why events
occur either in the environment or in oneself.

In the basic case in

which the person is trying to disentangle the effects of the stable
features of his surrounding environment, the choice is between external
and internal attribution.

External attribution is the decision that the

effect is a result of the surrounding environment, and internal attribution is the decision that the effect results from the self,

Attribution

to the external stimulus rather than to the self requires that the
subject responds differentially to the stimulus, consistently, and in
consensus with other people's responses.

The subject in Schachter's

research, however, is involved in a unique, one-shot situation, and his
information is limited to that which the experimenter and stooge·give
him and what he can figure out on his own.

The more consistent the

information is, the more stable the attribution should be.

The sub-

ject's basic information is that he is aroused in this situation,
whereas he is not aroused all the time, and if he believes the injection
to be vitamins, there is no internal event, so that he attributes his
arousal to an external source rather than himself.

If the experimenter
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informs him that the injection he has received will produce arousal
symptoms, he is likely to accept this explanation because it is consistent and look upon the stooge's actions as unusual but discount the
effect of those actions on himself.

If, however, the subject is

misinformed or ignorant about the drug's effects, he will seek information that is consistent with his feelings, information which the stooge
handily provides.

Another element which comes into play is the trust-

worthiness of the informant.

The subject may decide that the drug has

caused his arousal, despite the fact that the experimenter has failed to
inform him or has misinformed him of the drug's effects.

This did occur

in the Schachter and Singer study and was called a "self-informing
tendency" on the part of some subjects.
have suspected the stooge of some

Additionally the subject might

~terior

motive and, therefore,

refused to accept his definition of the situation as euphoric or angry.
Attribution in Schachter's studies consisted of the subjects looking at
the total information they had about the situation, cognitively deciding
which element seemed most consistent with his subjective feeling of
arousal, and labeling that element as the cause.
Schachter discussed his own research and that of others about
arousal and emotion in terms of labeling (1964).

Verbal descriptions by

those experiencing emotional situations without arousal (because of
spinal cord lesions) and drug-induced arousal in a non-emotional
situation both contain an "as if" quality.

Persons with spinal cord

lesions report that they act "as if" they are upset but do not truly
feel emotional in situations which were emotion-arousing before their
injury.

Persons injected with adrenalin described themselves as
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feeling "as if" they were emotional but that they really were not.
Furthermore, pot smokers had to learn that the sensations associated
with pot-smoking highs were pleasurable before they began to enjoy
smoking, and children learned from their mothers to confuse the
sympathetic arousal of intense emotional situations with hunger.

All

these situations involve labeling sensations appropriate to the specific
situation.
Schachter and Latan~ (1964) studied the effects of arousal on
avoidance learning in two groups--nor,mal persons and sociopathic ones.
Earlier research on animals showed poor avoidance learning for both very
high and very low levels of arousal.

The best avoidance learning

occurred at moderate levels of arousal
Wynne and Solomon, 1955).

(Latan~

and Schachter, 1962;

Singer (1963) found that the amount of

emotional behavior displayed by both rats and humans was a direct
function of the degree of arousal.

This may explain the results of the

animal studies; too little arousal probably means the subject is not
paying attention to the task while too much arousal seems to produce
emotional behavior that interferes with the task.
Latan~

Schachter and

chose sociopaths for research because, as a group, they show

little guilt (arousal) and fail to profit from unpleasant experience
(avoidance learning).

On a four-choice maze with one correct and one

shocked alternative, normal and sociopathic subjects learned
well the positively reinforced task.

e~ually

However, the normal subjects

learned the avoidance task much better than the sociopaths.

When

adrenalin was administered to both groups, the results were reversed.
Presumably, the high arousal produced in normal subjects interfered with
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learning the avoidance task.

One would also presume that since the

sociopaths learned more easily, the adrenalin must have increased their
ordinarily low levels of arousal to a moderate level which facilitated
learning.

Furthermore, high autonomic reactivity is associated with

either very low anxiety and emotionality, as in the case of sociopaths,
or very high anxiety and emotionality, as in the case of anxiety
neurotics.

Schachter emphasizes the importance of cognitive labeling of

high autonomic reactivity.

He feels that sociopaths exhibit indiscrimi-

nant reactivity to all events, so that they fail to apply a cognitive
label of emotion while anxiety neurotics label all events emotional and
therefore trigger autonomic activity.
If Schachter's theory of emotion is applied to depression, it
corresponds somewhat to Beck's cognitive theory of depression.

Beck

proposes cognitive schema which construct the experience, the self, and
the future as negative and cause the affective state of depression

(1967, 1974). This appears to correspond to Schachter's proposal that a
person may label events as depressing and trigger autonomic activity.
However, Schachter's theory might further propose that a person may
experience arousal and define it as depression because the situation
contains cues for depression.

Research has not explored this aspect.

This interaction allows more flexibility in explaining the origins of
depressive states as well as providing a rationale for chronic depression.

One who is chronically depressed may have learned to label most

arousal states as depression, just as the children mentioned previously
learned to label intense emotions a hunger.

Additionally such a person

may learn to label himself negatively, and this stable negative
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self-image may trigger a more or less permanent state of arousal.
Prolonged s.rmpathetic activity could account for many of the s.rmptoms of
depression such as work inhibition, sleep disturbance, fatigue, irritability, and somatic preoccupation that represent interference with
normal behavior patterns.

Schachter's theory of emotion is able to

account for the origins, maintenance, and.a number of symptom patterns
of depression.

MEASUREMENTS OF DEPRESSION

In measuring depression, it was necessary to find separate

instruments directed toward state and trait depression.

The trait

depression measure is needed for determining long-term, stable tendencies toward depressed affect, the basis for dividing subjects into
groups of high and low trait depression.

The state depression measure

should be capable of discriminating temporary changes in mood before and
after treatment conditions.

Beck's Depression Inventory (1967) and the

MMPI-D scale (1960) are examples of trait depression measures, and
Lubin's Depression Adjective Check Lists (1967) is a state depression
measure.
The MMPI-D scale is one of ten scales developed b,y Hathaway and
McKinley (1967) from a pool of 1000 purposely vague statements.

The

items were administered to groups of normal adults, college students,
and

p~chiatric

patients with instructions to indicate which items

applied to them and which did not.

Data analysis reduced the number of

items to 566, and ten scales were derived from the subjects' patterns of
responses to these items.

Most of the 60 items in the D scale were

selected through comparison of normals and a group of depressed
atric patients.

p~chi

A number of items were introduced to minimize eleva-

tions on the D scale for

p~chiatric

cases whose primary diagnosis was

not depression (Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom, 1972).
reliability of the D scale is 0.80 for male

p~chiatric

Test-retest
cases.

Validity

in terms of agreement with ratings of depression by staff members ranges
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between 0.51 and 0.61.

The D scale does have drawbacks in that it is

not a pure measure of depression.

Several studies have indicated that

there are approximately five clusters in the D scale including hostility
and anxiety, though the difficulty in differentiation seems to be a
function of paper-and-pencil measures in general.

D scores measure not

only depressive feelings but associated physical feelings as well
(Costello and Comrey, 1967).
Beck's method of scale construction began with the s.ymptoms
integral to depression and the construction of categories including a
· series of statements reflecting varying degrees of severity. (1967).
Scores represented a combination of the number of s.ymptoms endorsed and
their severity.

The items do not reflect any theory of etiology or

underlying ps.ychological process.

Beck observed and recorded character-

istic attitudes and s.ymptoms which appeared to be specific to depressed
patients and which were consistent with descriptions of depression
contained in the ps.ychiatric literature.

From these possibilities, he

used 21 categories, each describing a specific behavioral manifestation
of depression and consisting of a graded series of four or five evaluative statements.

The statements are ranked on a continuum from neutral

to maximum severity and assigned a numerical value to indicate severity.
In some categories, two of the statements are equivalent and receive the
same numerical weight.
L

2.
3·
4.
5·
6.
7·
8.

The categories were:

Mood
Pessimism
Sense of failure
Lack of satisfaction
Guilty feelings
Sense of punishment
Self-dislike
Self-accusations

9·
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Suicidal wishes
Crying spells
Irritability
Social withdrawal
Indecisiveness
Distortion of body image
Work inhibition
Sleep disturbance
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17. Fatigability
18.

19.

20. Somatic preoccupation
21. Loss of libido

Loss of appetite
Weight loss

The inventory was administered to new inpatient and outpatient ps.ychiatric hospital admissions, either
interview with a ps.ychiatrist.

direc~ly

before or directly after an

The ps.ychiatrists rated each patient

globally for depth of depression as well as on specific indices representing the pooled experience of the clinicians.

These ratings agreed

within one degree on the four point scale in 97% of the cases.
half reliability was 0.93 for 97 cases.

Split-

Correlations between inventory

scores and clinical ratings ranged between 0.61 and 0.67 for several
studies of validity.
Lubin (1967) culled a pool of adjectives connoting varying
degrees of depression and elation from dictionaries, books of s.ynonyms,
r

etc.

The items were administered to groups of normal women and severely
Item analysis identified 171 items that

depressed ps.ychiatric patients.

discriminated among the two groups and that were subsequently divided
into four lists of similar differentiating power.

The same process was

carried out with groups of normal and depressed males yielding a smaller
number of discriminating items divided into three lists.

Lubin felt

that these differences reflected culturally conditioned differences in
self-reporting (1965).

Split-half reliability on the lists ranged

between 0.82 and 0.93 for normals and 0.86 and 0.93 for patients.
Correlations between lists range from 0.80 to 0.93, so that the lists
may be considered equivalent.

Cross-validation on new groups found

significant differences in scores for groups of normals, non-depressed
patients, and depressed patients.

Correlations with MMPI-D and Beck
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Inventory scores ranged between 0.25 and 0.66, all of which are significant.

The final lists have 22 positively scored adjectives and 10

negatively scored adjectives on the female lists and 22 positively and
12 negatively scored adjectives on the male lists.

A major criticism is

that the DACL measures other affective states than depression including
fatigue, lack of vigor, bewilderment, and unfriendliness (McNair, 1972).
This criticism is similar to that of the MMPI-D.

METHODS OF PRODUCING AROUSAL
A common method of inducing arousal is by injection of drugs
such as adrenalin and epinephrine.

For example, Schachter and Singer

(1962), Schachter and Wheeler (1962), and Singer (1963) used drugs,
which produced arousal, and placebos,· which controlled for any effects
of the actual injection.

Frankenhaeuser, Jarpe, Svan, and Wrangsjo

(1963) used placebos alone tu produce arousal s.ymptoms. Frankenhaeuser,
Post, Hagdahl, and Wrangsjoe (1964) used placebos in producing depres&ve symptoms also.
shock.

Schachter anu

Latan~

(1964) used drugs and electric

The threat of shock produced arousal which facilitated avoidance

learning in normal subjects; whereas drugs were necessary to produce the
same effects in sociopaths.

Shock was also used by Nisbett and Schach-

ter (1966) to produce pain and arousal while a placebo was perceived by
subjects as a source of some of their arousal symptoms.
Ego threats are a third method of producing arousal.

Valins and

Ray (1967) used subjects who were afraid of snakes, a natural threat, to
illustrate that cognitions about internal states are important to
systematic desensitization procedures.

Subje~ts

given false feedback

that indicated that they were not internally aroused by snake stimuli
showed more approach behavior when confronted by a live snake.

Dienst-

bier and Munter (1971) and Schachter and Ono (cited in Schachter and
Latan~,

1964) ·took a different tack with students, implying that the

results of the test they took as part of the experiment were vital to
their success in school.

Dienstbier and Munter used placebo
20

drugs~

21
saying that they were responsible for arousal symptoms.
Ono used chlorpromazine to reduce arousal

~mptoms.

Schachter and

In both cases

subjects who were drugged, or who believed they were, cheated more on
th~

tests because they felt less aroused by the test or attributed more

of their arousal to the drug.
Drugs may be a more common method of inducing arousal because
they are more certain of producing arousal than ego threats and less
obviously noxious than shock.

Some subjects may be so afraid of either

shock or injection that they may refuse to participate in the experiment.

Ego threats are better from this standpoint, but they are more

difficult to control--what is threatening to some subjects may not be to
others.

The best results are likely to be obtained with a preselected

group such as Valins and Ray, whose group was college freshmen who can
be expected to be concerned with success in college.

Placebos are not

used directly in producing arousal to any great extent but are often
used in conjunction with other methods, either as control or as fake
treatment.

Selection of a means of producing arousal depends on the

group on which it is to be used and the context of its use.

HYPOTHESES
In order to look at the relationship between arousal and depression, the present experimental study was designed to explore the following hypotheses:
1)

Individuals with high levels of trait depression will

exhibit higher scores on the state measure of depression than those with
low levels of trait depression.
2)

Levels of depression will interact with the type of instruc-

tions given for the drug's effects, so that a) individuals with high
levels of trait depression will show increases on the state measure when
given stimulant instructions, b) individuals with low levels of trait
depression will show no change on this measure, and c) neither group
will show changes in state depression when given quiescent instructions.

3)

Individuals with high levels of trait depression will be

less persistent in attempting additional mazes than those with low
levels of trait depression.

4)

Levels of trait depression will interact with the type of

instructions given for the drug's effects, so that a) individuals with
high levels of trait depression and stimulant instructions will attempt
fewer mazes than those with low levels of trait depression and stimulant
instructions, b) individuals with high or low levels of trait depression
and quiescent instructions will show no difference in the number of
mazes attempted, and c) individuals with high trait depression and
stimulant instructions will attempt fewer mazes than those with high
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2)
levels of trait depression given quiescent instructions.

5)

Individuals who receive stimulant instructions will admit to

more arousal than those who receive quiescent instructions.

METHODS
Subjects
Subjects were 40 students from introductory
at Loyola University.

p~chology

classes

Students participate in research as partial

fulfillment of course requirements.

Half the subjects were male, half

female.
Subjects were pretested with the MMPI-D and the Beck scales.
They were divided into groups on the basis of high or low scores on both
tests, using a median split for the MMPI-D.

D scale means were 69.4 for

depressed subjects and 44.2 for non-depressed subjects.

No subject in

either the depressed or non-depressed groups reached the standard cutoff
on the Beck scale, but the mean score of the depressed group was 2.6
while the mean score of the non-depressed group was 0.6.

Half the males

and half the females were classified as having high levels of trait
depression and the other half as having low levels of trait depression.
Tests
Three paper-and-pencil measures of depression were used.

The

first, Beck's Depression Inventory, is a 13 item questionnaire in which
the subject is instructed to select the response of four alternatives
that best describes his present attitudes.

This measure is thought to

measure both state and trait aspects of depression.
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The second measure, the MMPI-D scale, consists of 60 items which
the subject is instructed to answer either true or false as they apply
to him.

This test is primarily a measure of trait depression.
The Depression Adjective Check Lists (DACL) consist of 32 or 34

self-descriptive adjectives depending on the form used.

Subjects are

instructed to check off each adjective which the respondent regards as
descriptive of "how you feel now--today."
Apparatus
The apparatus was simple, consisting of a sophisticated-looking
EEG machine with two electrodes.

The machine emitted a pre-recorded

audible beep.
Procedures
Subjects were pretested with the MMPI-D and the Beck scales

In

a placebo "drug" and biofeedback technique, subjects were given a pill
to take and told that the ''drug" was being tested for its effects on
concentration.

Possible side effects of the placebo were described.

Half the subjects then received a description of arousal side effects
such as faster heart rate, sweating palms, butterflies in the stomach,
and increased galvanic skin response.

The other half received a de-

scription of side effects of boredom or quiescence such as relaxed
muscles, sleepiness, slower heart rate, and decreased GSR.

Subjects

were then connected to a "biofeedback" machine by fake electrodes
attached to the back of the neck and the forehead and instructed to
concentrate on a complex visual pattern in front of them.

After the
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electrodes were attached, all subjects heard an audible beep signal that
had been pre-recorded on tape but appeared to come from the "biofeedback.,
machine.

They were told the signal indicated that the electrodes

attached were picking up changes in the neural activity associated with
the effects of the drug and transmitting them to the biofeedback
machine.

This was purported to demonstrate the drug's effects on the

subject's concentration.
The experimental task consisted of a series of complex mazes
administered to all subjects.

The

subje~ts

were told to solve the mazes

as quickly as possible and were given a very short time limit within
which to do this.

The first three demonstration mazes were relatively

less complex than later mazes and they were easily solvable.

The

experimenter demonstrated the proper solution to any subject who was
unable to solve it alone.

Later mazes were unsolvable, however, and the

time limit was intended to prevent subjects from discovering this fact.
The mazes were administered in quick succession and were intended to
produce a failure experience.

In the intertrial interval on later mazes

subjects received verbal feedback which became increasingly negative,
beginning with "Let' s try· another since you couldn't solve that one.,
after the fourth maze to "You haven't done well at all so far" after the
seventh maze with a final statement of the number of mazes the subject
solved with the remark that the score is rather low.
The DACL was given three times:

once as pretest, immediately

after the biofeedback, and after administration of the mazes.

Subjects

wereal.,so asked to rate their subjective level of arousal at these times
and once again at the end of the testing.·
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After the last administration of the DACL, a second series of 12
mazes was made available, the total number of whicq attempts was to be a
measure of persistence.

Subjects were told that they would be given a

chance to work more mazes of the same type with the same time limit in
order to try to develop a better strategy of solving the mazes.

Sub-

jects were told that the experimenter would like their cooperation but
that they did not have to if they did not want to work further mazes.
Finally the subjects were thoroughly debriefed as to the nature
and purpose of the experiment and the deceptions involved.

They were

cautioned not to reveal this knowledge to others.
Design
The DACL was analyzed by a 2x2x2x3 ANOVA with repeated measures
on the fourth variable.

The variables of interest are high and low

levels of trait depression, arousal and non-arousal instructions, sex,
and the three administrations of the DACL.

There were 10 males with

high trait depression, 10 males with low trait depression, 10 females
with high trait depression, and 10 females with low trait depression.
Persistence was operationalized as the number of mazes attempted.

This

data was analyzed by a 2x2x2 ANOVA with high and low levels of depression, arousal and non-arousal instructions, and sex as the variables.
Subjective arousal as indicated Qy self-report was analyzed by a 2x2x2x4
ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable.

The variables of

interest are high and low levels of trait depression, arousal and nonarousal instructions, sex, and the four administrations of self-report
of arousal.

RESULTS
Depression Adjective Check Lists
The first dependent variable was· the number of dysphoric adjectives endorsed by each subject on the Depression Adjective Check Lists
at pretest (Time 1), after the feedback (Time 2), and after the first
set of mazes (Time J).

Scores on the DACL.were subjected to a 2x2x2x3

ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable.

The variables of

interest were sex, high and low trait depression, stimulant and quiescent drug effect instructions, and time.

The mean number of dysphoric

adjectives endorsed by subjects on the DACL is presented in Table 1.
High trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to exhibit
higher scores on state depression measures than low trait-depressed
individuals.

A main effect for trait depression was found, F(1, 96)=

5.53, p<.02, reflecting a mean of 2.08 for the high depression group and
1.21 for the low depression group.

The interaction of Depression X Time

was not significant, F(2, 96)=0.)2, p=N.S.
A Depression X Instruction X Time interaction was hypothesized
in which stimulant instructions would produce increasing DACL scores for
high trait-depressed subjects but no change for low trait-depressed
subjects.
group.

Quiescent instructions would result in no change for either

The Depression X Instruction X Time interaction effect was not

significant, F(2, 96)=0.45, p=N.S.

Although means for the stimulant

instructions were in the direction predicted, 1.40, 1.70, and 2.90,
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Table 1
Mean Number of Uysphoric Adjectives Endorsed by Subjects on DACL
Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

Depressed Males

1.80

1.80

2.60

Depressed Females

1.00

1.60

).20

Non-depressed Males

0.40

0.60

1.40

Non-depressed Females

1.00

0.80

0.80

Totals

1.05

1.20

2.00

Depressed Males

0.4o

2.40

3.00

Depressed Females

3-20

2.60

1.40

Non-depressed Males

0.80

1.00

2.40

Non-depressed Females

2.4o

1.60

1.40

Totals

1.70

1.90

2.05

1.38

1.55

2.03

Stimulant
Instructions

Quiescent
Instructions

Overall Totals
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respectively, for depressed subjects and 0.70, 0.70, and 1.10 for nondepressed subjects, with quiescent instructions

DAC~

scores fluctuated

unevenly in opposite directions for the high and low trait-depressed
groups.

Means for high trait-depressed groups were 0.80, 2.50, and 2.20

under quiescent instructions, and means for low trait-depressed groups
were 1.60, 1.30, and 1.90.

Other interactions in the analysis did not

reach significance.
Persistence
The second dependent variable was the number of the second set
of mazes attempted.

Scores were subjected to a 2x2x2 ANOVA.

bles of interest were sex, depression, and instructions.

The varia-

The mean

number of extra mazes attempted by subjects is presented in Table 2.
Subjects with high trait-depression were hypothesized to attempt
fewer mazes than those with low trait-depression.

Depressed subjects

attempted slightly more mazes (x~4.95) than non-depressed subjects
(X~.80), but the main effect of depression was non-significant,

F(1,

32)~0.02, ~N.S.

A Depression X Instruction interaction was Qypothesized such
that under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects would attempt
fewer mazes than non-depressed subjects and under quiescent instructions,
the depressed and non-depressed groups would not differ in the numbe+ of
mazes attempted.

The Depression X Instruction effect was non-signifi-

cant, F(1, 32)~1.99, ~N.S., and only partly in the expected direction.
Under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects attempted fewer mazes
(x~3.80)

than non-depressed subjects (X=5.30) as predicted, but under

Table 2
Mean Number of Extra Mazes Attempted by Subjects
Stimulant

Quiescent

Instructions

Instructions

Depressed Males

J.6o

Depressed Females

4.00

.s.so
6.40

Non-depressed Males

.s.oo

4.40

Non-depressed Females

5.60

4.20

Totals

4 •.5.5

.5.20
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quiescent instructions, rather than doing an equal number of mazes,
depressed subjects did more mazes (X=6.10) than non-depressed subjects
(X=4.30).
Subjective Feelings of Arousal
The third dependent variable was the subject's estimate of his
own arousal based on a scale "from one to ten, in which one is so
relaxed that you're about to fall asleep and ten is so nervous that
you're about to jump out of your skin."

Scores were subjected to a

2x2x2x4 ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable.
2, and 3 for this measure are the same as for the DACL.
after the second set of mazes.

Times 1,

Time 4 was

Variables of interest were sex, depres-

sion, instructions, and time.
It was hypothesized that subjects receiving stimulant instructions would admit to more arousal than subjects receiving quiescent
instructions.

The main effect for instructions was non-significant

though in the expected direction, F(1, 121)=1.59, p=N.S.

The mean for

stimulant instructions was 5.18 and for quiescent instructions was 4.81.
Another effect approaching significance was the Depression X
Instruction interaction, F(1, 121)=3.21, p<.08.

Under quiescent in-

structions depressed subjects reported more arousal (X=5.03) than nondepressed subjects (X=4.58), and under stimulant instructions depressed
subjects reported less arousal (X=4.88) than non-depressed subjects
(X=5.48).

DISCUSSION
The only hypothesis which was unequivocally supported is the one
proposing that subjects with high levels of trait depression will exhibit higher scores on the state measure of depression than those with low
levels of trait depression.

The MMPI-D scale was used to measure trait

depression or long-term, stable tendencies toward depressed affect.

The

DACL was used to measure state depression, that is, temporary changes in
mood.

Subjects classified as trait-depressed by relatively higher

scores on the MMPI-D claimed more depressed feelings on the three administrations of the DACL as well, although the changes over time in DACL
scores were less pronounced than expected.

The DACL may be a less

responsive measure than anticipated in terms of discriminating temporary
changes in depressed affect among the subjects used in this study.

Both

these measures have drawbacks in that neither is a pure measure of
depression.

The MMPI-D taps anxiety, hostility, and physical factors as

well as depression while the DACL includes fatigue, lack of vigor,
bewilderment, and unfriendliness in its score.

Despite these difficul-

ties, the relationship between scores was significant.
Data failed to support the other hypotheses which were derived
from the combination of Beck's theory of depression and Schachter's
theory of emotion applied to depression.

Beck describes the affective

state of depression as the consequence of an individual's negative
interpretation of behavioral or situational cues.

Extending Beck's

theory to Schachter's theory applied to depression, one would conclude
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that a person may experience arousal and define it as depression because
of characteristic cognitive sets.

Non-significance of results in this

area can, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that few of the subjects in
the so-called "depressed" group were clinically depressed according to
scores on the pretest measure.

Of the depressed male subjects, eight

scores were only one standard deviation above the mean {i.e., T score of

.50) and two scores were two standard deviations above the mean.

Of the

depressed female subjects, only three scored one standard deviation
above the mean, the rest scoring less than one standard deviation above
the mean.

This indicates that for the most part, the subjects classi-

fied as trait-depressed experienced relatively low levels of depression.
Indeed only three subjects reported that they felt depressed enough to
seek counseling.

The DACL scores contributed to this problem as well in

that more than 60% of the scores were three or less of a possible 12.
The DACL does not provide sufficiently fine discrimination at such low
levels of depression as these subjects generally experienced.

Future

research might more profitably use truly depressed subjects in investigations.
A number of methodological improvements could be made in the
present study.

One possibility is use of other measures.

Neither the

MMPI-D nor the DACL is a factorially pure measure of depression and the
other factors may be obscuring changes in depressed affect.

Additional,;.,

ly, the DACL scores were highly skewed with a modal score of zero.
Either a more sensitive measure should be used or care should be taken
to insure that depressed groups are truly depressed and easily discriminated from non-depressed groups in terms of trait test scores.
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Another serious problem is found in the biofeedback procedure in
that it did not produce the desired result of significantly stimulated
or -quiescent feelings.

The measure may have been insensitive since it

produced a single global subjective

r~ting

of arousal.

A more extensive

measure tapping various physiological Slfmptoms such as heart rate,
respiration, etc. separately could be more useful in determining levels
of arousal.

The instructions may not have been convincing enough.

In

future, the exaffiiner might insist, for example, that the subject not eat
or smoke for several hours before the experiment and be prepared not to
d.ri ve. or study for several hours afterward.

Such instructions would be

more likely to impress the subject with the efficacy of the "drug"
he/she is to ingest.

An additional problem was that the biofeedback

procedure was intrinsically soporific and the mazes intrinsically stimulating, thereby obscuring effects of the instructions.

This difficulty

might be overcome by shortening the biofeedback session to reduce boredom.

(The feedback session became shorter over the course of this study

as the examiner became bored with it and as a response to complaints
from earlier subjects that the audio signal was quite annoying.)

Anoth-

er alternative might be to eliminate the biofeedback procedure altogether and simply administer the placebo with appropriate instructions and
monitor the subjective level of arousal.

An alternative to the mazes

for producing depression might be a less intrinsically stimulating task
such as reading sad stories or rating depressing pictures.

SUMMARY
This investigation of the relationship between arousal and
depression attempts to combine Beck's theory of depression and Schachter's theory of emotion as it is applied to depression.

Beck theorized

that one's cognitive schema result in one constructing the experience of
the self, the world, and the future as negative and thereby causing the
affective state of depression.

Extending Beck's theory to Schachter's

theory of emotion applied to depression leads to the hypothesis that
arousal states may be labeled depression on the basis of characteristic
cognitive sets.
Measurements of both state and trait depression were used.

The

state depression measure, Lubin's Depression Adjective Check Lists, was
intended to discriminate temporary changes in mood before and after
treatment conditions.

Beck's Depression Inventory and the MMPI-D scale

were trait depression measures intended to determine long-term, stable
tendencies toward depressed

affect~

The MMPI-D is well known as one of

ten scales developed by administering 1000 purposely vague items to
groups of normal persons and ps.ychiatric patients and eliminating those
items which were not statistically significant.

Reliability and validi-

ty are reasonably high but the MMPI-D does measure other factors besides
depression.

Beck

const~ucted

his scale from a series of statements

reflecting s.ymptoms integral to depression and tested them on new
inpatient and outpatient ps.ychiatric cases.

Relaibility and validity
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are sufficiently high.

Lubin gathered a pool of adjectives connoting

degrees of elation and depression and administered them to groups of
normal persons and psychiatric patients.

Item analysis was employed to

divide the statistically significant adjectives into lists.

Reliability

and validity are sufficiently high, but the DACL is not a pure measure
of depression.

All three tests correlate significantly.

Subjects were 20 males and 20 females from introductory psychology classes.

They were pretested with the MMPI-D and Beck scales and

half were classified trait-depressed and half non-trait-depressed.

The,y

were administered a placebo described as having stimulant or.quiescent
effects and a faked biofeedback procedure intended to convince subjects
that they were indeed feeling stimulated or sedated.

Subjects then

attempted a series of insoluble mazes intended to produce a failure
experience.

The DACL was administered as a pretest, after the feedback

session, and after the mazes.

After the last measure, subjects were

asked to attempt more mazes as a measure of persistence.
their arousal four times during the experiment.

Subjects rated

Data from the DACL,

persistence, and arousal measures were analyzed by ANOVA with levels of
depression, type of instructions, and sex as the variables of interest.
It rras expected that scores on trait and state measures would be
related.

Trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to show in-

creased state depression under stimulant instructions but non-depressed
individuals would not, nor would either group under quiescent instructions.

Trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to be less persis-

tent than non-trait-depressed individuals.

Trait-depressed subjects

under stimulant instructions were hypothesized to be less persistent
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than non-depressed subjects under stimulant instructions or either group
under quiescent instructions.

Subjects under stimulant instructions

were qypothesized to admit more arousal than those under quiescent
instructions.
The first dependent variable was the number of dysphoric adjectives endorsed by each subject on the DACL at each of three administrations.

High trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to exhibit

higher scores on state depression measures than low trait-depressed
individuals.

This qypothesis was supported by a significant main effect.

High trait-depressed subjects were hypothesized to show increased DACL
scores under stimulant instructions.

Low trait-depressed subjects under

stimulant instructions would show no change nor would either high or low
trait-depressed subjects under quiescent instructions.

This qypothesis ·

was not supported; the interaction effect was non-significant though in
the expected direction.

No other main effects or interactions were

found to be significant.
The second dependent variable was the number of the second set
of mazes attempted.

Subjects with high trait-depression were hypothe-

sized to attempt fewer mazes than those with low trait-depression. This
hypothesis was not supported by a significant main effect.

Depressed

subjects under stimulant instructions were hypothesized to attempt fewer
mazes than non-depressed subjects, and under quiescent instructions, the
depressed and non-depressed groups would not differ in the number of
mazes attempted.

This hypothesis was not supported; the interaction was

non-significant and not entirely in the expected direction.

Under stim-

ulant instructions, depressed subjects attempted fewer mazes than
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non-depressed subjects as predicted, but under quiescent instructions,
depressed subjects attempted more mazes than non-depressed subjects,

No

other significant main effects or interactions were found.
The third dependent variable was the subject's own estimate of
his arousal.

Subjects receiving stimulant instructions were hypothe-

sized to admit to more arousal than subjects receiving quiescent
instructions.

This hypothesis was not supported; the main effect was

non-significant.

Another effect approached significance.

Under quies-

cent instructions, depressed subjects reported more arousal than nondepressed subjects, and under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects
reported less arousal than non-depressed subjects.
Data demonstrated a strong relationship between scores on the
state and trait measures of depression.

The state depression measure,

the DACL, appears to be less responsive to temporary mood changes than
anticipated, a distinct drawback in this type of study.

Neither the

DACL nor the MMPI-D is a pure measure of depression, tapping other
factors such as anxiety, hostility, and confusion, but this seems not t9
have affected this study significantly.
Data failed to support any hypotheses derived from the combination of Beck's theory of depression and Schachter's theory of emotion
applied to depression.

Non-significance of results in this area could

be attributed to the fact that the depressed and non-depressed groups
were not sufficiently differentiated in terms of MMPI-D and Beck pretest
scores.

For the most part, subjects classified as trait-depressed

experienced minimal levels of depression.

In addition, the DACL scores
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were highly skewed with the modal score of zero.

The DACL does not

provide a fine enough discrimination at such low levels of depression.
A number of methodological improvements could be made in the
present study.

More sensitive measures for depression and subjective

arousal would be appropriate.
would also be appropriate.

The use of more severely depressed groups

The biofeedback procedure should be made

less soporific and the task less arousing.
the placebo could be more convincing.

Instructions accompanying

Use of improved procedures in a

replication should be helpful in determining the strength of trends
discovered in this study.
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